connectivity. This ease of connectivity offers many advantages, but it does suffer from significant weaknesses such as (1) an unauthorized user could read or steal confidential information easily as all the information is stored in a 'plaintext' format, specifically unencrypted binary, and (2) an attacker could intercept all the information sent over the bus as the channel can be open to the attacker (e.g. physical, virus or malware) between the device and the computer.
User authentication and session key agreement is an efficient way to resolve the aforementioned difficulties. It is worth noting that all the confidential files and data would then be stored in an encrypted form. The established session key from the authentication protocol would be used as an encryption key. In this regard, a user authentication and session key agreement protocol should be implemented in order to negotiate a session key. Avoiding a verification table at the server end is the most desirable property in this regard. Simple Password Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) method [1] , proposed by Jablon is a well known PasswordAuthentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol which is based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [2] . Subsequently, Hao and Shahandashti [3] showed that SPEKE [1] suffered from the impersonation attack and the session key negotiation attack. Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) [4] is well known PAKE protocol that was proposed by Harkins. In 2000, Hwang and Li [5] , and Sun [6] proposed user authentication schemes, however Chan and Cheng [7] calculated that Hwang and Li's scheme [5] suffered from the user impersonation attack. Furthermore, Shen, Lin and Hwang [8] subsequently proposed an enhanced scheme compared to Hwang and Li's scheme [5] . In 2004, Ku and Chen [9] proposed a password based authentication scheme, but Yoon, Ryu and Yoo [10] showed that Ku and Chen's scheme [9] was vulnerable to the parallel session attack so they proposed a counter measure scheme.
In 2010, Yang, Wu and Chiu [11] proposed an authentication protocol for USB MSDs. However, in order to avoid the insider attack and the off-line password guessing attack [12] , research focused on using user biometrics [13] as a further factor to the user authentication protocol. Li and Hwang [14] proposed a biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme in 2010. However, in 2011, Das [15] derived that Li and Hwang's scheme [14] had flaws in the login phase, authentication phase and password change phase. To overcome these flaws, Das [15] also proposed an authentication scheme. An [16] showed that Das's scheme [15] cannot resist the server masquerading attack, user impersonation attack, password guessing attack and insider attack, and so proposed an improved scheme. Li et al. [17] found that An's scheme [16] suffered from the denial-of-service (DoS) attack, the forgery attack and also did not provide forward secrecy. In 2014, He et al. [18] also proposed a biometric scheme based on a three-factor security protocol for USB MSDs. In the same year, Jiping et al. [19] also proposed a biometric and password based authentication scheme to overcome the weaknesses of Das's scheme [16] . This paper, shows that the Jiping et al. scheme [19] does suffer from the forgery and password guessing attacks. This paper then proposes an efficient Biometric and Password based Secure User Authentication Scheme (BPSUAS) for consumer USB MSDs to overcome the weaknesses in the current literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II a discussion is presented on the basic concepts of the cryptographic one-way hash function and biometric extraction mechanism as the background for this work. Section III briefly addresses the scheme presented by Jiping et al. [19] and the security weaknesses of their scheme is presented in Section IV. Section V presents the authentication scheme proposed in this work and the security of the proposed scheme is analyzed in Section VI. Section VII presents the performance evaluation and Section VIII finally concludes the paper. TABLE I shows the nomenclature that is used throughout the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
This section defines the collision resistant cryptographic one-way hash function [20] and the collision resistant fuzzy extractor [21] , [22] in order to analyze the security of this proposed scheme. 
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Pr E denotes the random event E. 
(2) for all probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms GEN and REP. 
IV. CRYPTANALYSIS OF THE JIPING ET AL. SCHEME
This section considers the forgery attack and off-line password guessing attack using the scheme described by Jiping et al. [19] .
A. Forgery Attack
Consider adversary A trapping all the communication messages between i U and S during execution of the protocol.
Thus, A will know all the parameters 2  3  1  3  4  7   2 , , , Therefore, the forge login request message satisfies the validity of the authentication of S. Hence, the adversary can impersonate a valid user to login to S.
After receiving the login message at timestamp
s T from A, S tests   [ ] a s i T T T   (
B. Off-line Password Guessing Attack
Adversary A can extract information from the USB MSD by monitoring power analysis [23] , [24] . Thus, if the USB MSD of i U is lost or stolen, A can obtain the parameters   , ( ), , , , ,
Then, A can perform the following steps to guess the password of i U :
Step 1: A chooses a random password [ ] a i pw and computes
Step U due to the low entropy property of the password [18] . Therefore, given time, the scheme from Jiping et al. [19] cannot resist the off-line password guessing attack.
V. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the proposed scheme derived from this research. The proposed scheme consists of a registration phase, a login phase, an authentication and session key agreement phase, a data retrieval phase and then password update phase.
Server S chooses a cryptographic one-way hash function   h  such that when using an arbitrary input binary string then a fixed length binary string is created. This process can be symbolized as
, where l is a fixed length (say, 128 bits) integer. S also chooses a multiplicative cyclic group G of order n, a generator g of the group G and a secret key x. Then, S publishes   , , g n h  as the public parameters and keeps x secret.
A. Registration Phase
Whenever i U wants to access data on their USB MSD through S, then the registration phase is invoked. i U can register to S by:
1. 
The terminal tests
If the equality fails then the terminal rejects the login from i U .
3. The MSD computes 
D. Data Retrieval Phase
When i U wants to access the data in the MSD, i U inserts their MSD into the client terminal, provides their password 
E. Password Update Phase
The password update phase is invoked when i U wants to change their password. , 
The terminal tests for
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VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
The formal security analysis of the proposed scheme under the random oracle model is presented in this section. This security analysis uses the formal security analysis under the generic group model of cryptography. In the following, this work defines random oracles for the formal security analysis of the proposed scheme:
 OracleH is a random oracle which unconditionally outputs the input m for the corresponding given hash value y = h(m).  OracleFE is a random oracle which contains two parts: 1. OracleFE GEN unconditionally outputs the pair (ψ,θ) from the corresponding given biometric parameter b; 2. OracleFE REP unconditionally outputs ψ from the corresponding biometric parameter b and uniform distribution binary string θ .
Theorem 1:
Under the assumption that a cryptographic oneway hash function   h  acts as a random oracle, the proposed scheme derived from this work (BPSUAS) is then provably secure against adversary A for deriving the secret key x of server S after obtaining the stored information into the memory of the MSD, and capturing the login message and the reply message of the authentication phase during communication between i U and S. 
In p u t : , , O u tp u t : 0 o r 1 
Accepts x* as correct secret key of server S 12:
Return 1 (success) 13:
Return 
where the maximum is taken over all A with the execution time t, the number of queries qH made to the OracleH oracle. The proposed scheme is said to be provably secure against A deriving the shared secret key SK between i U and S if 
A. Discussion of the Presented Theorems
Theorem 2 demonstrated that the proposed scheme is secure against the off-line password guessing attack. Theorem 3 demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure against the session key recovery attack because, without knowing random numbers α and β then A cannot compute the session key SK u . In the proposed scheme, all communicating messages depend on random numbers α or β and the time-stamp. So, all the communication messages are guaranteed to be different for every session. Thus, A cannot mount a replay attack on this proposed scheme. In this proposed scheme, A cannot mount a forgery attack without knowing secret password i pw of i U , the secret key x of the server S and random numbers α and β generated by i U and S respectively. Theorems 1 and 2 show that the secret information of the server and the user are secure from A. Thus, it is infeasible to mount a forgery attack on this proposed scheme. In this proposed scheme, i U does not need to send their password i pw to S in the registration phase and also for authentication purposes. Thus, the server has no knowledge of i U 's password 
Calls 
S
[a] to get service from S [a] by accessing the MSD of user i U . Therefore, this proposed scheme is secure against the insider attack.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section compares the performance of the proposed scheme with related schemes in the literature [1] , [4] , [11] , [14] [15] [16] , [18] , [19] . The login and authentication phases of the proposed scheme have been compared with the related existing schemes in the literature [11] , [14] [15] [16] , [18] , [19] because these phases are commonly used.
TABLE II presents the communication (overhead) and storage costs of this work compared to the literature. As can be seen, while the communication cost of this work is higher than the literature due to the session management overhead (required to solve the vulnerabilities in the literature), the storage cost is comparable to the literature.
TABLE III verifies the types of attacks that are considered, the key management and the authentication that the literature uses compared to this work.
TABLE IV presents the computational cost of this work compared to the literature. T h is the time required for the hashing operation, T e for exponentiation operation and T enc /T dec for the symmetric key encryption/decryption operation. Typically, the time complexity associated with these operations can be expressed as T e >T dec /T enc ≈T h [25] . Although the proposed scheme has high time complexity than the literature, the proposed scheme can resist the attacks as detailed in [18] schemes. The low communications cost compared to the wide range of attacks that can be resisted means that the proposed scheme offers an improved trade-off with the computational cost, communication cost and security than in the literature. This scheme is therefore a practical solution for USB MSD security.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has enhanced the current state of the art in biometric security algorithms by defending against the forgery attack, the off-line password guessing attack and the replay attack. An efficient mutual authentication protocol has been presented in order to negotiate session keys which were used to encrypt data for a USB MSD device enabling secure "USB memory sticks". Moreover, the paper has formally proved that 
